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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

vs.

Case No.
10234

LESLIE D. P APP ACOSTAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF·

STATEMENT OF 'l,HE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Leslie D. Pappacostas, appeals
from a conviction for the crime of grand larceny upon
jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with grand larceny and
second degree burglary. Prior to trial a motion to

3
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suppress certain evidence was made on the basis of an
alleged illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied
the motion to suppress. '!"he jury returned a verdict
of guilty to the charge of grand larceny, and the appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should be
affirmed.

STATEMEN'l, OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement
of facts as being a more accurate statement of the evidence received at trial.
On January 6, 1964, Pehrson's Hardware Store
in Salt Lake City closed as usual at 6:00p.m. (T. 29).
On January 7, 1964, when an employee opened the
store, he noted holes in the wall, that boxes which had
contained guns were opened and empty, and that the
store was generally "torn up" (T. 31, 32).
Mr. Paul Pehrson, the store owner, noted that $88,
a Land camera, $5 in stamps, and 15 to 18 guns were
missing. Exhibit 1, a .357 Magnum pistol, was identified
as one of the missing guns (T. 39}. Although Mr.
Pehrson had no personal knowledge of whether the
gun had been stolen or sold by an employee, his busi·

4
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•

ness records showed that the gun was not sold and was
not properly taken from the store (T. 46, 49, 77-84).
On January 10, 1964, three days after the larceny,
Officer William Litton of the Las Vegas Police Department was alerted to be on the lookout for a 1963
Ford having Utah license plates which had been recently changed ( T. 60) . Officer Litton observed the vehicle
pull into a service station in Las Vegas. He approached
the vehicle's driver and asked if he could see his driver's
license and registration (T. 60, 61). The owner of
the vehicle was a Mr. Bates Anderson, the driver. As
Mr. Anderson opened the console between the front
seats to get his registration, Officer Litton noticed
a .22 caliber pistol (T. 62). He ordered the four occupants in the car to get out (T. 62). The defendant
was in the right front seat immediately in back of the
glove compartment (T. 61). Officer Litton put all
parties under arrest and searched the vehicle ( T. 61 ) .
He found several other guns in the glove compartment,
including a .357 Mangum pistol, the serial number
of which matched the serial number of the gun taken
from Pehrson's store (T. 54, 63). The license plates
on the vehicle were not those for which the vehicle
was registered .(T. 86, 87). Burglary tools were also
found (T. 66).
The appellant, Leslie Pappacostas, was questioned
concerning the .357 magnum and told the Las Vegas
police that the gun belonged to him (T. 74), that he
had purchased the weapon several months previous in

5
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a bar, and had brought it with him to Nevada (T. 8687). The gun was valued at $115 (T. 39).
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO

SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for grand larceny.
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appellant's
position when the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
The record discloses that on January 6, 1964,
numerous items of property were apparently taken
from Pehrson's Hardware in Salt Lake City. The
evidence relating to the taking of this property shows
that the store was secured for the night and that in the
morning $88 cash, $5 in stamps, a Land camera, and
fifteen to eighteen guns had been taken. A hole had
apparently been opened in the roof or wall. According
to the records kept in the regular course of business
by the Pehrson Hardware store, a .357 magnum pistol
(Exhibit I ) had been taken from the store. No record
of any kind disclosed that the pistol had been sold
and Mr. Pehrson, who kept reasonable control over

6
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the store, was of the opinion that the item had been
illegally removed from his store.
Three days later the item was recovered from the
glove compartment of a motor vehicle in Las Vegas,
Nevada, in which the appellant was riding as an occupant. Burglary tools were also recovered. The appellant admitted that the P.istol was his and claimed that
he had purchased it approximately two months previous
and had it in his possession when he went to Nevada.
Under thes circumstances, it is submitted that the
evidence more than satisfies the requirements to sustain a conviction of grand larceny.
There is no evidence that other persons stole the
property and in State v. Gillespie~ 117 Utah 114, 213
P.2d 353, this court observed that under the provisions
of Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
only elements the State need establish for the crime
of larceny are recently stolen property in the possession
of the defendant and an unsatisfactory explanation
of the possession. It is apparent that all the elements
of the crime are present in this case. The evidence
discloses sufficient circumstances to support a belief
that the .357 magnum pistol was taken from Pehrson's
on the· night of January· 6, 1964. The property was
admittedly in the possession of the appellant some three
days subsequent to the burglary and he admitted
taking the pistol to Nevada. By his own admission,
the recent possession of stolen property is established.
The fact that at the time he was apprehended he did
not have the pistol on his person is of no consequence

7
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in view of his admission that he had the pistol and his
claim of ownership. Further, the appellant's statement
that he had purchased the pistol in a bar two months
previous to his arrest is obviously an unsatisfactory
explanation of the possession and, therefore, evidence
of the appellant's guilt.
The appellant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to show that the pistol had been taken from
Pehrson's Hardware does not bear up under analysis.
Mr. Pehrson himself testified that the gun was taken
from his shop. He indicated that he kept close control
over his gun inventory and that in his opinion the gun
was not sold. Further, a record check of his inventory
records disclosed that the pistol had not been sold.
The preceding evidence, when coupled with the obvious
evidence of a larcenous taking on January 6 or 7,
1964, and the defendant's unsatisfactory explanation
of his possession of the pistol is sufficient to sustain
the conviction of larceny. State v.....4llred_, 16 U.2d 41,
395 P.2d 535 (1964); State v. Cappas_, 100 Utah 274,
114 P.2d 205.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GIVING INS'TRUCTION NO. 6, AND THE
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM ERROR IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS SINCE APPROPRIATE EXCEPTIONS 'VERE NO'l, TAKEN.
8
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The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in giving its Instruction No. 6 and in failing to give
appellant's requested instruction on possession of recentely stolen property. It is submitted that appellant
has· not preserved the issue on appeal. At the time
for taking exceptions, counsel merely stated (T. 95):
"At this time, your Honor, the defendant
takes exceptions to the judge's instructions to
the jury in this matter, on the grounds that it
fails to correctly state the law, is contrary to
the evidence - more particularly, in that the
judge denied the defendant's requested Instructions Numbers I, 2, and 3. Submitted, your
Honor."
It is well settled that a general exception to instructions to the jury is insufficient to raise any question
on appeal. State v. King~ 24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418;
State v. Campbell~ 25 Utah 342, 71 Pac. 529; State
v. Judd~ 74 Utah 398, 279 Pac. 953. In State v. Woods~
62 Utah 397, 220 Pac. 215 (1923), this court observed,
with reference to the general exception or objection
similar to that in the instant case:

" * * * With

some slight variations the objection interposed by counsel in each instance
was, 'I object to the remarks of the district
attorney and assign it as prejudicial error,' or
'I except to the remarks of counsel and assign
it as prejudicial error.' This sort of objection
or exception, without anything further, without
a proper request for instructions to the jury
and a ruling by the court, and an exception
reserved at the proper time, presents nothing
for review on appeal."

9
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At the time of taking exceptions, counsel did
nothing which would alert the court as to the defects
which are now claimed on appeal. The function of an
exception is, in part, to bring to the court's attention
specific claims wherein an instruction may be deficient
so that it may be corrected and the jury properly apprised. Since counsel did not see fit to indicate to the
court with any particularity wherein he felt that Instruction No. 6 given by the court was deficient, that
instruction cannot be challenged for the first time on
appeal, in the absence of a showing that such an instruction totally deprived the appellant of a fair trial or
was palpably erroneous. State v. Cobo., 90 Utah 89,
60 P.2d 952 {1936).
It is submitted that the instruction as given by
the court properly apprised the jury of the elements
of the crime of larceny and was not prejudicial. Instruction No. 6 must be read in conjunction with
Instruction No. 5, 'vhich enumerated the specific
elements of the crime of larceny (R. 5). Instruction
No. 5 advised the jury that larceny was the felonious
stealing, taking, or carrying away of the personal property of another. This is the specific language of Section
76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Further, the
court explained each of the elements for the crime of
grand larceny and advised the jury that they must
find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instruction No. 6, as given by the court, covers the
last sentence of Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Anno·
tated, 1953, which makes possession of property re·

10
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cently stolen evidence of guilt. The appellant complains that the instruction as given was defective in
two facets: first, that the statement preliminary to the
instruction, that the definition of larceny includes the
concept of possession of recently stolen property, was
prejudicially erroneous; and, second, that the instruction somehow does ,not advise the jury that recent
possession was an evidentiary fact to be considered by
them in determining the appellant's guilt.
The second contention is obviously without merit,
since the instruction itself advises the jury that the
possession of recently stolen property is only a presumption which can be rebutted by other evidence.
Further, the instruction advises the jury that the
possession must be of property "recently stolen" and
that there must be a failure to make a "satisfactory
explanation" of the possession. The instruction as
given was completely in accord with the decision of this
court in State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228,
and sets forth adequately the rule recognized by this
court in State v. Gillespie~ supra, and State v. Allred~
supra, that possession of recently stolen property, without a satisfactory explanation of the possession, is
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of
guilt.
The appellant also seems to argue that the instruction should have encompassed the language in the
requested instruction that the possession be conscious,
exclusive and unexplained. It is submitted that the

11
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instruction clearly encompasses these elements since
the court's instruction refers to the necessity of satisfactory explanation and to the necessity of the property
being recently stolen. Further, Instruction No. 5
required the jury to find knowledge on the part of the
appellant. It should be noted, however, that no decision
of this court has ever required a jury to be instructed
that the possession must be conscious and exclusive.
State v. Butterfield~ 70 Utah 529, 261 Pac. 804, and
State v. l(insey_, 77 Utah 348, 295 Pac. 247, merely
recognize that consciousness and exclusivity are factors
to be considered in weighing the sufficiency of the
evidence. This court has recognized that possession
may be joint possession. State v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379,
199 P.2d 155. Thus, the term "exclusive" does not
refer to individual possession. The statement in appellant's brief, that the jury, had it been so instructed
that the possession required was exclusive, could well
have found that the possession in the glove compartment nonexclusive, points up the error in appellant's
argument. First, it overlooks the admissions of the
appellant which reflect exclusive possession and, secondly, it evidences the failure to recognize that the
possession could have been joint in an appropriate
case. In this case the admissions establish the appellant's
possession and the fact that the gun, when recovered,
was in a glove compartment of an automobile in which
others were riding is immaterial.
The appellant's additional argument, that the
reference to recent possession as being part of the

12
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definition of larceny was prejudicial, is equally without
merit. Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which contains the definition of the term larceny, also
contains the reference to possession of recently stolen
property. App~llant argues that referring to this aspect
of the law of larceny as part of the definition of the
crime of larceny would allow the jury to convict without
a finding that there had been a taking. This is obviously absurd. First, the court instructed the jury on
the requirement of finding a "taking" in Instruction
No. 5 and also on the other elements making up the
crime of larceny. Instruction No. 6 uses the word
"includes" which simply means that this is an additional
aspect of the law of larceny to that already instructed
upon. Therefore, in order to convict, the jury was
instructed that it would have to find the elements in
Instruction No. 5 and the recent possession elements
in Instruction No. 6, since they were also included as
a necessary part of the crime of larceny in the case.
This court has consistently ruled that instructions should
be looked at as a whole. State v. Hendricks~ 123 Utah
267, 258 P.2d 452; State v. Evans~ 107 Utah I, 151
P.2d 196; State v. Siddoway~ 61 Utah 189, 211 Pac.
968. When Instruction No. 6 is viewed with Instruction No. 5 and the other instructions given in the case,
along with the posture of the evidence, it is apparent
that the jury was not misled. In State v. Donovan)
77 Utah 343, 294 Pac. 1108, and State v. Crowder~
114 Utah 202, 197 P.2d 917, this court held the substance of instructions similar to that given in the instant

13
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case not to be prejudicial. It is apparent that no prejudice resulted from the instruction as given.

POINT III

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
ON THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS THE RESULT
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The appellant's contention that the .357 magnum
pistol was obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure is plainly erroneous. Taking the facts apparently found by the trial court, it appears that Officer
Litton of the Las Vegas Police Department was
alerted by reliable information communicated through
police channels, to be on the lookout for a 1963 black
Ford having Utah license plates that had been recently
changed ( T. 60) . Officer Litton observed the motor
vehicle pull into a service station in Las Vegas. He
walked up to the driver's side of the car and asked
Bates Anderson, the operator and owner, for his registration. When Mr. Anderson opened the console of
the vehicle, the officer observed a .22 caliber pistol,
which was loaded. The registration for the vehicle did
not match the license plates on the vehicle. After
observing the pistol in the glove compartment, Officer
Litton instructed the occupants to get out of the car
and he placed the1n under arrest. Bates Anderson,

14
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the owner of the vehicle, was placed under arrest. Thereafter, a search of the vehicle was made. During the
search of the vehicle, the .357 magnum pistol was discovered. It is apparent that the search was made incident to a valid arrest, the valid arrest being of the
person of Bates Anderson, the driver and owner of the
vehicle.
Las Vegas City Ordinances, 1960, Title 6, Chapter
3, Section 7, prohibits an owner or operator of a motor
vehicle from carrying any concealed weapons in the
vehicle. When Officer Litton approached the car, he
immediately requested the registration. He did not
place any of the occupants under arrest. Upon observing the pistol in the console, a crime was committed
in his presence, and the arrest proper.
Section 482.275, Nevada Revised Statutes, requires
that the license plates issued for a motor vehicle be
attached to the automobile. In the instant case, the
license plates issued for the instant vehicle were not
those on the vehicle. Thus, another misdemeanor was
being committed in the presence of the officer. The
officer could validly arrest the driver of the vehicle and
search for any weapon or other contraband.
In State v. Dodge, 12 U.2d 293, 364 P.2d 798
(1961), this court ruled that a search incident to an
arrest was valid where the motor vehicle was being
operated with plates other than those for which it was
registered, in violation of Section 41-1-142 (c), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. This court ruled the search
15
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incident to an arrest by the officer was proper. 1 Therefore the Dodge case was precedent for the finding in
the instant case that the search was incident to a valid
arrest.
It is apparent that the arr~t of Bates Anderson,
for carrying a concealed weapon, was a valid arrest.
The officer did not arrest Anderson prior to asking
for his registration, nor did he search the vehicle. When
Anderson opened the console, the officer saw the
weapon which was plain to view and observed an offense
being committed in his presence.
In Campbell v. United States_, 289 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), Mr. Justice Burton of the United States
Supreme Court, sitting with the District of Columbia
Circuit Court, considered a case where officers noted
an automobile standing with its lights out and motor
running in Washington, D.C. The officer approached
the vehicle and asked the driver if he knew his lights
were out. The driver turned on his lights and the officer
asked the driver to show them his license and registration. As the driver opened the door to show the officers
his registration, the light disclosed clothing and other
property apparently the subject of a larceny. The
court in an opinion by Justice Burton ruled that the
officers at that moment had probable cause and the
subsequent arrest and search were valid. See also Robinson v. United States_, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
II'

Iln the Dodge case, the office1· made an arrest for a crime other
than that committed in his presence; but, since a crime was
being committed in his presence, the arrest was proper irrespective of the offense for ,,rhich the officer thought he was arresting
the individual.

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.
1948), officers observed the appellant and another man
pull away from the curb of a food store with their car
lights out. The officers stopped the vehicle and asked
to see the license and registration card. The officer
shined his flashlight into the car and noticed cartons
of cigarette contraband. 'fhe court held that the officers,
upon observing the contraband, had reasonable grounds
to believe a crime had been committed and that the
search was proper.
In State v. Griffin~ 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d
856 (1964) , the police approached a motor vehicle to
warn a motorist of the danger of a certain left turn
that was not illegal. They asked the motorist for his
license and, in the course of doing so, observed contraband on the back seat of the car. The court stated:
"The observations of the two police officers
justified the conclusion that the clothing they
observed was apparently stolen. The possession
of stolen property is illegal ; it is the equivalent
of contraband~ and is subject to seizure. See 17
C.J.S. Contraband, p ..510; Williams v. State,
216 Miss. 158, 61 So.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ;
State v. McKindel, 148 'Vash. 237, 268 P. 593
(Sup. Ct. 1928) ; State v. IIoffman, 245 Wis.
367, 14 N.W.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; State
v. Hawkins, 362 ::\Io. 152, 240 S.,V.2d 688
(Sup. Ct. 1951). l-Iaving observed the stolen
property, which was fullr djsclosed and in plain
view, Investigator \Valker was justified in opening the door of the motor vehicle and physically
examining the same. The constitutional guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are to protect
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persons against unreasonable searches and seiz.
ures. We hold that the search of defendants'
vehicle and the seizure of the stolen property
were reasonable under the circumstances of the
case.''
In State v. Brooks, 357 P.2d 735 (Wash. 1961),
police approached a vehicle in a no-parking zone and,
during the course of interrogating the driver and while
asking for the registration for the vehicle, observed
items on the back seat of the car which appeared to
be contraband. They then arrested the occupants and
made a search. The Washington Supreme Court up·
held the conviction, stating:
"In the instant case, one of the officers open~d
the automobile door in order to question the
appellant regarding the ownership of the auto·
mobile. This was not a part of an illegal search.
On the contrary, it was a reasonable course for
a police officer to take in handling a ease of an
illegally parked car when someone was sitting
in it. Once lawfully in that position, the officer
could observe what was there to be seen. As we
stated in State v. Llewellyn, supra [119 Wash.
306, 206 P. 396]:

'' ' * * * Once in the place, the officers were
justified in taking cognizance of the fact that
a crime was being committed by the defendant. The evidence thereof was before their
very eyes; it took no search to find it. * * * '
"The officer saw paper bags with clothing
consisting of uncuffed pants protruding from
them while he was in the process of questioning
the appellant concerning ownership of the autoInobile. As we have above decided, upon this
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observation, a lawful arrest could have been
made. Therefore, the search into the paper bags
and seizure of the contents prior to the arrest
of the appellant was lawful, and the trial court
properly denied the motion to suppress this evidence."

A case reaching- a similar result is, State v.
395 P .2d 745 (Wash. 1964).

Sullivan~

In Haerr v. United States~ 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1957), Border Patrol officers stopped a vehicle to inquire of the occupants and observed contraband in
the vehicle. They subsequently arrested the individuals
and Seized the contraband. In upholding the search,
the court observed:

"***

Stopping the automobile in quest of
aliens was the- duty of the Border Patrol, and
it was a part of the performance of this duty to
look into the automobile. Mere observation, however, does not constittue a search. United States,
v. Lee, 1926, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71
L.Ed. 1202; Ellison v. United States, D.C. Cir.
1953, 206 F.2d 476; United States v. Strickland,
D.C.S.C. 1945, 62 F.Supp. 468."
In United kYtates v. Lee~ 274 U.S. 559 (1926),
the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was
perfectly permissible for officers to base an arrest
upon what they viewed even if the viewing was by
artificial means.
In State v. Allred, 16 U.2d 41, 395 P.2d 535
(1964), this court ruled that where an officer stopped
a vehicle and observed items taken from a burglary
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in plain sight, the subsequent arrest and seizure were
legal.
In The Federal Law 01-~ Search and Seizure_, F.B.I.,
February 1962, it is stated:
"In the law on search of vehicles, equally with
that covering search of places, it is extremely
important for the law enforcement officer to
know what is not a search and what is not a seizure. Knowledge of the first of these will allow
the officer to judge how far he may go in the
inspection of a vehicle without having made an
illegal search which will void all subsequent
action in the case. For example, if an officer
making a lawful check of vehicle equipment at
a road block set up to verify motorists' compliance with safety regulations looks into the back
seat through any closed or open window and
sees therein clear evidence of a crime such as
possession of non-tax paid liquor, he then has
probable cause to immediately search the vehicle
for that crime. The officer originally saw the
evidence of a crime \vithout making a search,
and once having obtained his probable cause
lawfully in that manner he may then proceed to
make a search and take any other action called
for under the law."
It is apparent, therefore, that the officer, after
approaching the vehicle, observed what was a violation
of a Las Vegas City ordinance and, therefore, the subsequent arrest, and search, were proper. The appellant's argument to the contrary is, at best, a feeble
gesture, Davis, Jlederal Searches and Seizures_, 349,
350 (1964).
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CONCLUSION
The State's case was proved by strong and direct
evidence. It is apparent that the jury was clearly convinced from the testimony and exhibits of the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The argument
that the evidence is insufficient is without merit.
The jury was properly instructed and only by
hypercritical challenge could the instructions given be
said to have been prejudicial.
The claim of an illegal search and seizure is, at
best, not addressed to the applicable law and facts.
Under these circumstances, this Court should
affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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